Excerpts from the book "Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran", by Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, October 2005
On Chapter 1, "Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran: Report of the NPEC Working Group", by Henry Sokolski:
In Overview, at pages 1 and 2, "…(are) identified three threats that are likely to increase following Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons option: 1. Even More Nuclear Proliferation, 2. Dramatically Higher Oil Prices and 3. Increased Terrorism Designed to Diminish U.S. Influence.
In Overview, at pages 2 and 3: "Certainly, targeting Iran's nuclear facilities risks leaving other covert facilities and Iran's nuclear cadre of technicians untouched. More important, any overt military attack would give Tehran a casus belli either to withdraw from the NPT, or to rally Islamic Jihadists to wage war against the United States and its allies more directly."
In Background, at page 5: "…the truth is that Iran soon can and will get a bomb option"….. "As for eliminating Iran's nuclear capabilities militarily, the United States and Israel lack sufficient targeting intelligence to do this. In fact, Iran long has had considerable success in concealing its nuclear activities from U.S. intelligence analysts and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors"…."After being struck, Tehran could declare that it must acquire nuclear weapons as a matter of self-defense, withdraw from the NPT, and accelerate its nuclear endeavors".
In Background, at page 6: "In addition, Iran might respond to an overt military attack by striking back covertly against the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Israel through the support of non-Iranian terrorist organizations."
In Background, at pages 6 and 7: "What should we expect when, in the next 12 to 48 months, Iran secures such a [nuclear] breakout option? If the United States and its allies do no more than they have already done, two things. First, many of Iran's neighbors will do their best to follow its 'peaceful' example. Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Saudi Arabia will all claim that they too need to pursue nuclear research and development to the point of having nuclear weapons options…"…."Second, an ever more nuclear-ready Iran will try to lead the revolutionary Islamic vanguard throughout the Islamic world by becoming the main support for terrorist organizations aimed against Washington's key regional ally, Israel; America's key energy source, Saudi Arabia; and Washington's prospective democratic ally, Iraq".
In Background, at page 7: "Early in 2004, senior Saudi officials announced they were studying the possibility of acquiring or 'leasing' nuclear weapons from China or Pakistan…"…"Egypt earlier announced its plans to develop a large nuclear desalinization plant and is reported recently to have received sensitive nuclear technology from Lybia. Syria, meanwhile, is now interested in uranium enrichment."…"And Algeria is in the midst of upgrading its second large research reactor facility, which is still ringed with air defense units."…"…could Iraq,…, be expected to stand idly by? And what of Turkey…"
In Recommendations, at page 14: [Step] 3. Offer Russia a U.S. nuclear cooperative agreement, "To help secure the support for these [above related] resolutions from Russia, the United States should offer Moscow a nuclear cooperative deal that Moscow has long sought. This deal would allow Russia to store U.S. origin spent fuel from Asia and Europe and pocket 10 to 20 billion dollars in revenues from this business. For nearly a decade, U.S. progress on this deal has been stymied in the United States because Russian unwillingness to drop its nuclear cooperation with Iran."
On Part II "Tehran's Nuclear Endeavors: What's the Worry?", Chapter 2, "Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran", by Richard L. Russell:
On pages 23 and 24: "The American military is stretched thin with operations against insurgents in Iraq and would be poorly suited to undertake yet another ambitious military campaign against neighboring Iran."…"…domestic and international confidence in the quality of American intelligence is in doubt after an apparently less than stellar performance against Saddam's Iraq. For all of these reasons, Iran light calculate that the Americans are ill-prepared to move militarily against its nuclear weapons program."
On page 24: "But Arab states too will face new security challenges and burdens if faced with Iranian nuclear weapons capabilities. Authoritative Arab debate and discussion of the impact of Iranian nuclear weapons has not yet surfaced and probably should not be expected."
In Arab Threat Perception of Iran, at page 25: "Arab states traditionally have worked to balance Iranian power in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Most of the Arab states, with the notable exceptions of Syria and Yemen, politically, economically, and militarily backed Iraq in its war with Iran…"…"The substantial American military presence in the region as a legacy of the 1990-91 war…reassured Arab Gulf states that neither Iraq nor Iran would be able to mount an ambitious military campaign to upset the regional balance of power. Iran's election in 1997 of President Khatami, who was widely perceived as a moderating political influence in Tehran…led to a further easing of the Arab threat perception of Iran."
In Arab Threat Perception of Iran, at page 26: "The American ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq may have diminished further Arab concern about Iran's ability to leverage its geopolitical mass to dominate the Gulf. Arab states are in awe, if only privately, of American military capabilities that they witnessed slash through the massive Iraqi forces widely regarded as the most formidable Arab military forces in 1990. Arab military forces too must be impressed with the relative ease with which American and British forces smashed through Iraq to occupy Baghdad. Arab states must calculate that as long as American forces occupy Iraq, Tehran would not dare to undertake any conventional military operations to challenge the Gulf distribution of power."…"The Arab states have been slow to perceive the strategic threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons. As Judith Yaphe observes, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, 'have shrugged off dire predictions of the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.' "…"They [Arab diplomats, officials and military officers] reason that Iran nuclear weapons would have salutary effects on regional security because Tehran's nuclear arsenal would 'balance' Israeli and American nuclear weapons."…" They [Arab diplomats, officials and military officers] will have to worry that American security backing of Arab states may lessen in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons. Arab security policy officials would have to concede that the United States might be less willing to come to Arab states' aid in the event of a future regional crisis in which Iran wields nuclear weapons."
In Arab Threat Perception of Iran, at page 27: "In a future regional contingency, the Iranians could make limited land grabs in the Persian Gulf-whether against Iraq, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates-and hope to hold American conventional forces at bay with the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons." …"Arab states also will have to worry that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will embolden Tehran to revert to a more aggressive foreign policy. The clerical regime might calculate, for example, that it could give more material assistance and lessen restrictions on Hezbollah to engage in operations against Israeli and American interests."…"Tehran might calculate that it could support an even more ambitious unconventional terrorist campaign against American forces in the Gulf and the smaller Arab Gulf states that host American forces if it has a nuclear weapons arsenal. Tehran might assess that, even if its hand is exposed, the risks of American military retaliation would be minimum, given Iranian nuclear weapons. If push came to shove, Tehran could use nuclear weapons against American military assets or hosting countries in the region with Iranian ballistic missiles, or clandestinely insert them into the United States to directly target American cities and citizens."
In Arabs Weighing American and Israeli Reactions, at page 28: "How the United States and Israel behave toward an Iran armed with nuclear weapons will affect their [Arab defense planners'] security policies and strategies. Arab officials already are alarmed at what they see as an American precedent for waging preemptive or preventive war."…"…Arab officials appear to use these terms [preemptive and preventive] in conversations in English interchangeably. Arabs worry that the United States will move militarily against Iran either before or after Iran acquires nuclear weapons…". "The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, also worry that American military operations against Iran would give the Americans potentially too great an influence over the global oil market. The Arab states will be concerned about Israeli preemptive or preventive military action."
In Arabs Weighing American and Israeli Reactions, at page 29: "But Arab regimes will worry that Israeli military action against Iran would prove to be more volatile politically than American military action against Iraq had been. Arab military officers and diplomats have a hard time, though, understanding Israel's perception of geographic vulnerability and the severe security demands that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons have on Israeli defense policy. The Arab world has a begrudging respect for Israeli air power,…" "The mystique of Israeli air power, however, probably is larger than reality in the case of Iran, which is located a far reach from Israeli airspace. Depending on the flight route, Israeli aircraft would have to violate Jordanian, Syrian, Iraq, or Saudi airspaces to strike Iranian targets."…"…how squeamish the Turks are over relations with their southern neighbors."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 30: "…-against Iran's nuclear weapons infrastructure may simply be one bridge too far for American policymakers."…"How, then, are Arab states likely to react in the next 5 to 10 years to a suspected or demonstrated Iranian nuclear weapons stockpile and robust ballistic missile inventories as delivery means?" "Arab Gulf states will feel the Iranian threat most acutely."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 31: "…-the Iraqis will be under strong pressure to contemplate resurrecting Iraq's nuclear program to counterbalance Iran's nuclear weapons inventory. From Baghdad's perspective, Iran could parlay its nuclear weapons advantage to politically coerce Iraq. The Iranians, for example, could embark on an aggressive campaign to support Iraqi Shia opposition…"…"A Turkish decision to acquire nuclear weapons in response to Iran's nuclear arsenal would further increase Iraq's incentive to resurrect its nuclear weapons programs."…"…neither the Saudis nor the Iranians have abandoned their traditional aspirations to be the most influential nation-state in the Gulf."…"The Saudis probably would suffer a sense of political humiliation that the Iranians have the political prestige or reputation for power that accompanies nuclear weapons."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 32: "The Saudis would have to worry that a nuclear-armed Iran could again militarily threaten the Gulf."…"The Saudis also harbor deep mistrust of Israel and resent Israeli military prowess and nuclear weapons capabilities. The Saudis, too, have a wary eye on the military power of the United States."…"A Saudi nuclear weapons capability would work strategically to shore-up Saudi insecurities vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities, but also against potential hostile actions in the longer run from Israel, Iraq, and the United States. The Saudis have already taken several steps in this direction. In the 1980s, unknown to the United States, they secretly negotiated for and purchased intermediate range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China.
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 33: "The missiles would be ideal for delivering nuclear weapons, but poorly suited for delivery of conventional munitions…"…."Other press reports allege that then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz traveled to Pakistan in October 2003 and secured a secret agreement with President Pervez Musharraf, under which Pakistan will provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil."…"To greater and lesser degrees, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman gauge a threat from Iran in general."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 34: [China and Pakistan are potentially the providers of nuclear technology for Arab Gulf States.] "The Saudis, in contrast, have proven themselves adept at keeping secrets from the Americans. While Saudi Arabia may calculate that it could survive the international and American opprobrium that would accompany revelations of a Saudi nuclear weapons program,…"
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at pages 34 and 35: "The small Gulf Arab states, too, would have to worry that their nascent nuclear power infrastructure would be vulnerable to preventive and preemptive attacks from larger regional powers."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 35: "…the UAE, which perceives the Iranians as a threat more acutely than their Gulf Arab counterparts."…"The UAE has demonstrated a willingness to spend top dollar for defense as evident in procurement of combat aircraft from France and the United States, as well as Scud missiles from North Korea."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 35: "Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons will have security repercussions for Arab states beyond the immediate Persian Gulf area. Syria and Egypt are geopolitically central to Middle Eastern security and will see their interests most directly affected by Iran's nuclear weapons power."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 36: "Pakistan and North Korea are estimated to have 2002 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $462 and $903, respectively. Egypt and Syria have estimated 2002 per capita GDPs of $1190 and $1100, respectively."…"In the short term, Damascus might welcome Iran's nuclear weapons as a means to bolster, by association, its marginal regional power." "Over the longer run, Syria probably would come to see the negative strategic consequences of Iranian nuclear weapons."…"Damascus views Israel as its most formidable security threat."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 37: "The Syrian regime is isolated politically and might calculate that it has no other means to ensure its survival other than a nuclear deterrent."…"…,Damascus would have a major challenge keeping its nuclear program secret to avoid provoking Israeli preemptive or preventive military action…" "Tel Aviv probably could not tolerate Syrian possession of nuclear weapons, and, unlike the case of Iran, Israel has more than sufficient military capabilities needed to wage a sustained air campaign to damage Syrian political, military, and economical nodes significantly." "Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton…"."…expressed concern about Syria's nuclear activities, noting that Russia and Syria 'have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power'."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 38: "…Cairo is likely to view Iran's nuclear weapons as another blow to the Egyptian worldview as the leader in the Arab and Islamic worlds." [Note: On October 28th, 2006, Egypt announced his Nuclear research for Civil purposes]
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 39: "Cairo has long pressed diplomatically for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East as a means to negotiate away Israel's unilateral nuclear weapons advantage in the region."…"Nevertheless, the Egyptians have a nuclear research center with a Soviet-supplied two megawatt research reactor that started in 1961, and an Argentine-supplied 22 megawatt light water reactor that started in 1997. The Wisconsin Project estimates that the Argentine reactor gives Cairo access to bomb quantities of fissile material, possibly enough plutonium to make one nuclear weapon per year. If the Egyptians were to embark on a nuclear weapons program based on its nuclear power infrastructure, they would have to move gingerly much as the Syrians to reduce the risk of Israeli military action."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 40: "The American campaign against Saddam probably has shaken Egyptian and Syrian confidence in the deterrence value of chemical and biological weapons because the U.S. perception of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons stores was insufficient to deter the United States from waging a war against Baghdad. Israeli, American, and Iranian possession of nuclear weapons might pressure Syria and Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of their securities."…"In August 2002, Slovak authorities revealed that two North Korean agents based in Slovakia were procuring millions of dollars of ballistic missile components for Egypt."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 41: "The Egyptian ballistic missile program, which has escaped much international scrutiny, has benefited from substantial North Korea assistance…"…"Cairo might be rekindling its efforts to procure longer range missiles, calculating that U.S. attention is diverted elsewhere."
In American Policy Avenues, at page 43: "The United States needs to speak firmly and directly with the Egyptians and challenge the country on the activities of its ballistic missile forces, which could be the platform for nuclear weapons delivery in the future." "American leverage against Saudi Arabia will be less than is the case with Egypt."…"Still though, the Saudis continue to see the United States as a strategic backdrop that could potentially again bolster the Kingdom in a future contingency."…"The possession of nuclear weapons in Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be particularly troubling given the potential for political instability in these countries over the longer run. Both countries have a burgeoning demographic bulge of young and unemployed men who will be vulnerable for recruitment by domestic -especially militant Islamic- political opposition."
In American Policy Avenues, at page 43: "Syria will require more use of coercive diplomacy that entails the threat of force than the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, if the United States is to discourage Syria from undertaking the nuclear weapons route."…"Damascus needs to know directly and clearly that the initiation of a nuclear weapons program would be not tolerated and the American or Israeli military forces could wreak havoc on Syria's limited infrastructure and obsolete conventional forces, the destruction of which would leave the ruling regime wobbly."
In American Policy Avenues, at page 45: "…the "Carter Doctrine",…" "President Carter announced in January 1980, in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and closer proximity to the Persian Gulf, that "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America; any such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."
In American Policy Avenues, at pages 45 and 46: "The Gulf States with the experience of the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars have grown accustomed to benefiting from the provision of American ballistic missile defense coverage. And Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons undoubtedly will increase the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states' sense of vulnerability because one nuclear tipped Iranian missile could decimate the government ruling families, and societies of the smaller GCC states…"
In American Policy Avenues, at page 46: "…American ballistic missile defense systems…are capable of providing strategic protection to small states such as Qatar and Bahrain. The Arab Gulf states and the United States would have advantages in drawing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the Gulf to shore-up deterrence against a nuclear-ready Iran."…"The Europeans are all too willing to let political and military problems in the Middle East fester, to step aside and let the Americans carry the lion's share of the region's political-military burdens…"
In American Policy Avenues, at page 47: "The Gulf States understand that NATO can help politically contain American power, but, if push comes to shove in a future military contingency in the Gulf, only the Americans have the military power needed to act."…"The United States, with its preponderance of conventional forces, could threaten to remove the regime in Iran should nuclear weapons be used against American forces and regional partners. The reliance on conventional deterrence will underscore internationally the lack of usability of nuclear weapons, a mindset that, in turn, would dampen regional interest and prestige linked to nuclear weapons acquisition. Conversely, the American threat of nuclear weapons response in kind would heighten the importance and prestige of nuclear weapons and contribute to incentive for nuclear weapons to cause most likely the end of the regime in Tehran, but at the unacceptable moral cost of thousands to millions of innocent Iranian civilian lives. Massive and tightly targeted conventional force retaliation offers a profoundly more moral and strategically effective deterrent because the threat is more credible than nuclear weapons response in light of the American restraint in inflicting civilian casualties in numerous conflicts since the end of the Cold War."
On Chapter 3, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors", by Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd
In Introduction, at page 51: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has been suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Over the past 2 years, these suspicions have intensified due to revelations about Tehran's past failures to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of significant nuclear activities and facilities. The most serious failures have involved neglecting to declare extensive work on uranium enrichment and plutonium separation-the two routes to producing weapons-grade material for nuclear weapons."
to be continued
Total number of pages: 314
Reference: Book freely issued on WEB as PDF file at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil
In Overview, at pages 1 and 2, "…(are) identified three threats that are likely to increase following Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons option: 1. Even More Nuclear Proliferation, 2. Dramatically Higher Oil Prices and 3. Increased Terrorism Designed to Diminish U.S. Influence.
In Overview, at pages 2 and 3: "Certainly, targeting Iran's nuclear facilities risks leaving other covert facilities and Iran's nuclear cadre of technicians untouched. More important, any overt military attack would give Tehran a casus belli either to withdraw from the NPT, or to rally Islamic Jihadists to wage war against the United States and its allies more directly."
In Background, at page 5: "…the truth is that Iran soon can and will get a bomb option"….. "As for eliminating Iran's nuclear capabilities militarily, the United States and Israel lack sufficient targeting intelligence to do this. In fact, Iran long has had considerable success in concealing its nuclear activities from U.S. intelligence analysts and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors"…."After being struck, Tehran could declare that it must acquire nuclear weapons as a matter of self-defense, withdraw from the NPT, and accelerate its nuclear endeavors".
In Background, at page 6: "In addition, Iran might respond to an overt military attack by striking back covertly against the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Israel through the support of non-Iranian terrorist organizations."
In Background, at pages 6 and 7: "What should we expect when, in the next 12 to 48 months, Iran secures such a [nuclear] breakout option? If the United States and its allies do no more than they have already done, two things. First, many of Iran's neighbors will do their best to follow its 'peaceful' example. Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Saudi Arabia will all claim that they too need to pursue nuclear research and development to the point of having nuclear weapons options…"…."Second, an ever more nuclear-ready Iran will try to lead the revolutionary Islamic vanguard throughout the Islamic world by becoming the main support for terrorist organizations aimed against Washington's key regional ally, Israel; America's key energy source, Saudi Arabia; and Washington's prospective democratic ally, Iraq".
In Background, at page 7: "Early in 2004, senior Saudi officials announced they were studying the possibility of acquiring or 'leasing' nuclear weapons from China or Pakistan…"…"Egypt earlier announced its plans to develop a large nuclear desalinization plant and is reported recently to have received sensitive nuclear technology from Lybia. Syria, meanwhile, is now interested in uranium enrichment."…"And Algeria is in the midst of upgrading its second large research reactor facility, which is still ringed with air defense units."…"…could Iraq,…, be expected to stand idly by? And what of Turkey…"
In Recommendations, at page 14: [Step] 3. Offer Russia a U.S. nuclear cooperative agreement, "To help secure the support for these [above related] resolutions from Russia, the United States should offer Moscow a nuclear cooperative deal that Moscow has long sought. This deal would allow Russia to store U.S. origin spent fuel from Asia and Europe and pocket 10 to 20 billion dollars in revenues from this business. For nearly a decade, U.S. progress on this deal has been stymied in the United States because Russian unwillingness to drop its nuclear cooperation with Iran."
On Part II "Tehran's Nuclear Endeavors: What's the Worry?", Chapter 2, "Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran", by Richard L. Russell:
On pages 23 and 24: "The American military is stretched thin with operations against insurgents in Iraq and would be poorly suited to undertake yet another ambitious military campaign against neighboring Iran."…"…domestic and international confidence in the quality of American intelligence is in doubt after an apparently less than stellar performance against Saddam's Iraq. For all of these reasons, Iran light calculate that the Americans are ill-prepared to move militarily against its nuclear weapons program."
On page 24: "But Arab states too will face new security challenges and burdens if faced with Iranian nuclear weapons capabilities. Authoritative Arab debate and discussion of the impact of Iranian nuclear weapons has not yet surfaced and probably should not be expected."
In Arab Threat Perception of Iran, at page 25: "Arab states traditionally have worked to balance Iranian power in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Most of the Arab states, with the notable exceptions of Syria and Yemen, politically, economically, and militarily backed Iraq in its war with Iran…"…"The substantial American military presence in the region as a legacy of the 1990-91 war…reassured Arab Gulf states that neither Iraq nor Iran would be able to mount an ambitious military campaign to upset the regional balance of power. Iran's election in 1997 of President Khatami, who was widely perceived as a moderating political influence in Tehran…led to a further easing of the Arab threat perception of Iran."
In Arab Threat Perception of Iran, at page 26: "The American ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq may have diminished further Arab concern about Iran's ability to leverage its geopolitical mass to dominate the Gulf. Arab states are in awe, if only privately, of American military capabilities that they witnessed slash through the massive Iraqi forces widely regarded as the most formidable Arab military forces in 1990. Arab military forces too must be impressed with the relative ease with which American and British forces smashed through Iraq to occupy Baghdad. Arab states must calculate that as long as American forces occupy Iraq, Tehran would not dare to undertake any conventional military operations to challenge the Gulf distribution of power."…"The Arab states have been slow to perceive the strategic threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons. As Judith Yaphe observes, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, 'have shrugged off dire predictions of the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.' "…"They [Arab diplomats, officials and military officers] reason that Iran nuclear weapons would have salutary effects on regional security because Tehran's nuclear arsenal would 'balance' Israeli and American nuclear weapons."…" They [Arab diplomats, officials and military officers] will have to worry that American security backing of Arab states may lessen in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons. Arab security policy officials would have to concede that the United States might be less willing to come to Arab states' aid in the event of a future regional crisis in which Iran wields nuclear weapons."
In Arab Threat Perception of Iran, at page 27: "In a future regional contingency, the Iranians could make limited land grabs in the Persian Gulf-whether against Iraq, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates-and hope to hold American conventional forces at bay with the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons." …"Arab states also will have to worry that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will embolden Tehran to revert to a more aggressive foreign policy. The clerical regime might calculate, for example, that it could give more material assistance and lessen restrictions on Hezbollah to engage in operations against Israeli and American interests."…"Tehran might calculate that it could support an even more ambitious unconventional terrorist campaign against American forces in the Gulf and the smaller Arab Gulf states that host American forces if it has a nuclear weapons arsenal. Tehran might assess that, even if its hand is exposed, the risks of American military retaliation would be minimum, given Iranian nuclear weapons. If push came to shove, Tehran could use nuclear weapons against American military assets or hosting countries in the region with Iranian ballistic missiles, or clandestinely insert them into the United States to directly target American cities and citizens."
In Arabs Weighing American and Israeli Reactions, at page 28: "How the United States and Israel behave toward an Iran armed with nuclear weapons will affect their [Arab defense planners'] security policies and strategies. Arab officials already are alarmed at what they see as an American precedent for waging preemptive or preventive war."…"…Arab officials appear to use these terms [preemptive and preventive] in conversations in English interchangeably. Arabs worry that the United States will move militarily against Iran either before or after Iran acquires nuclear weapons…". "The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, also worry that American military operations against Iran would give the Americans potentially too great an influence over the global oil market. The Arab states will be concerned about Israeli preemptive or preventive military action."
In Arabs Weighing American and Israeli Reactions, at page 29: "But Arab regimes will worry that Israeli military action against Iran would prove to be more volatile politically than American military action against Iraq had been. Arab military officers and diplomats have a hard time, though, understanding Israel's perception of geographic vulnerability and the severe security demands that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons have on Israeli defense policy. The Arab world has a begrudging respect for Israeli air power,…" "The mystique of Israeli air power, however, probably is larger than reality in the case of Iran, which is located a far reach from Israeli airspace. Depending on the flight route, Israeli aircraft would have to violate Jordanian, Syrian, Iraq, or Saudi airspaces to strike Iranian targets."…"…how squeamish the Turks are over relations with their southern neighbors."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 30: "…-against Iran's nuclear weapons infrastructure may simply be one bridge too far for American policymakers."…"How, then, are Arab states likely to react in the next 5 to 10 years to a suspected or demonstrated Iranian nuclear weapons stockpile and robust ballistic missile inventories as delivery means?" "Arab Gulf states will feel the Iranian threat most acutely."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 31: "…-the Iraqis will be under strong pressure to contemplate resurrecting Iraq's nuclear program to counterbalance Iran's nuclear weapons inventory. From Baghdad's perspective, Iran could parlay its nuclear weapons advantage to politically coerce Iraq. The Iranians, for example, could embark on an aggressive campaign to support Iraqi Shia opposition…"…"A Turkish decision to acquire nuclear weapons in response to Iran's nuclear arsenal would further increase Iraq's incentive to resurrect its nuclear weapons programs."…"…neither the Saudis nor the Iranians have abandoned their traditional aspirations to be the most influential nation-state in the Gulf."…"The Saudis probably would suffer a sense of political humiliation that the Iranians have the political prestige or reputation for power that accompanies nuclear weapons."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 32: "The Saudis would have to worry that a nuclear-armed Iran could again militarily threaten the Gulf."…"The Saudis also harbor deep mistrust of Israel and resent Israeli military prowess and nuclear weapons capabilities. The Saudis, too, have a wary eye on the military power of the United States."…"A Saudi nuclear weapons capability would work strategically to shore-up Saudi insecurities vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities, but also against potential hostile actions in the longer run from Israel, Iraq, and the United States. The Saudis have already taken several steps in this direction. In the 1980s, unknown to the United States, they secretly negotiated for and purchased intermediate range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China.
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 33: "The missiles would be ideal for delivering nuclear weapons, but poorly suited for delivery of conventional munitions…"…."Other press reports allege that then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz traveled to Pakistan in October 2003 and secured a secret agreement with President Pervez Musharraf, under which Pakistan will provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil."…"To greater and lesser degrees, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman gauge a threat from Iran in general."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 34: [China and Pakistan are potentially the providers of nuclear technology for Arab Gulf States.] "The Saudis, in contrast, have proven themselves adept at keeping secrets from the Americans. While Saudi Arabia may calculate that it could survive the international and American opprobrium that would accompany revelations of a Saudi nuclear weapons program,…"
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at pages 34 and 35: "The small Gulf Arab states, too, would have to worry that their nascent nuclear power infrastructure would be vulnerable to preventive and preemptive attacks from larger regional powers."
In The Gulf Neighborhood, at page 35: "…the UAE, which perceives the Iranians as a threat more acutely than their Gulf Arab counterparts."…"The UAE has demonstrated a willingness to spend top dollar for defense as evident in procurement of combat aircraft from France and the United States, as well as Scud missiles from North Korea."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 35: "Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons will have security repercussions for Arab states beyond the immediate Persian Gulf area. Syria and Egypt are geopolitically central to Middle Eastern security and will see their interests most directly affected by Iran's nuclear weapons power."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 36: "Pakistan and North Korea are estimated to have 2002 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $462 and $903, respectively. Egypt and Syria have estimated 2002 per capita GDPs of $1190 and $1100, respectively."…"In the short term, Damascus might welcome Iran's nuclear weapons as a means to bolster, by association, its marginal regional power." "Over the longer run, Syria probably would come to see the negative strategic consequences of Iranian nuclear weapons."…"Damascus views Israel as its most formidable security threat."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 37: "The Syrian regime is isolated politically and might calculate that it has no other means to ensure its survival other than a nuclear deterrent."…"…,Damascus would have a major challenge keeping its nuclear program secret to avoid provoking Israeli preemptive or preventive military action…" "Tel Aviv probably could not tolerate Syrian possession of nuclear weapons, and, unlike the case of Iran, Israel has more than sufficient military capabilities needed to wage a sustained air campaign to damage Syrian political, military, and economical nodes significantly." "Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton…"."…expressed concern about Syria's nuclear activities, noting that Russia and Syria 'have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power'."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 38: "…Cairo is likely to view Iran's nuclear weapons as another blow to the Egyptian worldview as the leader in the Arab and Islamic worlds." [Note: On October 28th, 2006, Egypt announced his Nuclear research for Civil purposes]
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 39: "Cairo has long pressed diplomatically for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East as a means to negotiate away Israel's unilateral nuclear weapons advantage in the region."…"Nevertheless, the Egyptians have a nuclear research center with a Soviet-supplied two megawatt research reactor that started in 1961, and an Argentine-supplied 22 megawatt light water reactor that started in 1997. The Wisconsin Project estimates that the Argentine reactor gives Cairo access to bomb quantities of fissile material, possibly enough plutonium to make one nuclear weapon per year. If the Egyptians were to embark on a nuclear weapons program based on its nuclear power infrastructure, they would have to move gingerly much as the Syrians to reduce the risk of Israeli military action."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 40: "The American campaign against Saddam probably has shaken Egyptian and Syrian confidence in the deterrence value of chemical and biological weapons because the U.S. perception of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons stores was insufficient to deter the United States from waging a war against Baghdad. Israeli, American, and Iranian possession of nuclear weapons might pressure Syria and Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of their securities."…"In August 2002, Slovak authorities revealed that two North Korean agents based in Slovakia were procuring millions of dollars of ballistic missile components for Egypt."
In The Levant Neighborhood, at page 41: "The Egyptian ballistic missile program, which has escaped much international scrutiny, has benefited from substantial North Korea assistance…"…"Cairo might be rekindling its efforts to procure longer range missiles, calculating that U.S. attention is diverted elsewhere."
In American Policy Avenues, at page 43: "The United States needs to speak firmly and directly with the Egyptians and challenge the country on the activities of its ballistic missile forces, which could be the platform for nuclear weapons delivery in the future." "American leverage against Saudi Arabia will be less than is the case with Egypt."…"Still though, the Saudis continue to see the United States as a strategic backdrop that could potentially again bolster the Kingdom in a future contingency."…"The possession of nuclear weapons in Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be particularly troubling given the potential for political instability in these countries over the longer run. Both countries have a burgeoning demographic bulge of young and unemployed men who will be vulnerable for recruitment by domestic -especially militant Islamic- political opposition."
In American Policy Avenues, at page 43: "Syria will require more use of coercive diplomacy that entails the threat of force than the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, if the United States is to discourage Syria from undertaking the nuclear weapons route."…"Damascus needs to know directly and clearly that the initiation of a nuclear weapons program would be not tolerated and the American or Israeli military forces could wreak havoc on Syria's limited infrastructure and obsolete conventional forces, the destruction of which would leave the ruling regime wobbly."
In American Policy Avenues, at page 45: "…the "Carter Doctrine",…" "President Carter announced in January 1980, in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and closer proximity to the Persian Gulf, that "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America; any such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."
In American Policy Avenues, at pages 45 and 46: "The Gulf States with the experience of the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars have grown accustomed to benefiting from the provision of American ballistic missile defense coverage. And Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons undoubtedly will increase the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states' sense of vulnerability because one nuclear tipped Iranian missile could decimate the government ruling families, and societies of the smaller GCC states…"
In American Policy Avenues, at page 46: "…American ballistic missile defense systems…are capable of providing strategic protection to small states such as Qatar and Bahrain. The Arab Gulf states and the United States would have advantages in drawing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the Gulf to shore-up deterrence against a nuclear-ready Iran."…"The Europeans are all too willing to let political and military problems in the Middle East fester, to step aside and let the Americans carry the lion's share of the region's political-military burdens…"
In American Policy Avenues, at page 47: "The Gulf States understand that NATO can help politically contain American power, but, if push comes to shove in a future military contingency in the Gulf, only the Americans have the military power needed to act."…"The United States, with its preponderance of conventional forces, could threaten to remove the regime in Iran should nuclear weapons be used against American forces and regional partners. The reliance on conventional deterrence will underscore internationally the lack of usability of nuclear weapons, a mindset that, in turn, would dampen regional interest and prestige linked to nuclear weapons acquisition. Conversely, the American threat of nuclear weapons response in kind would heighten the importance and prestige of nuclear weapons and contribute to incentive for nuclear weapons to cause most likely the end of the regime in Tehran, but at the unacceptable moral cost of thousands to millions of innocent Iranian civilian lives. Massive and tightly targeted conventional force retaliation offers a profoundly more moral and strategically effective deterrent because the threat is more credible than nuclear weapons response in light of the American restraint in inflicting civilian casualties in numerous conflicts since the end of the Cold War."
On Chapter 3, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors", by Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd
In Introduction, at page 51: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has been suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Over the past 2 years, these suspicions have intensified due to revelations about Tehran's past failures to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of significant nuclear activities and facilities. The most serious failures have involved neglecting to declare extensive work on uranium enrichment and plutonium separation-the two routes to producing weapons-grade material for nuclear weapons."
to be continued
Total number of pages: 314
Reference: Book freely issued on WEB as PDF file at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil
posted by Victor Ashkenazy | 9:25 AM
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